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MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE TASKFORCE
JANUARY 2005
The International Climate Change Taskforce
Rt Hon. Stephen Byers MP Sen. Olympia J Snowe
(United Kingdom) (United States)
Co-
Chair Co-ChairHon. Bob Carr MP (Australia)
Professor John P Holdren (United States)
Dr Martin Khor Kok-Peng (Malaysia)
Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet MP (France)
Dr Claude Martin (Switzerland)
Professor Tony McMichael (Australia)
Jonathon Porritt CBE (United Kingdom)
Adair Turner (United Kingdom)
Dr Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker MdB (Germany)
Professor Ni Weidou (People’s Republic of China)
Hon. Timothy E Wirth (United States)
Cathy Zoi (Australia)
Scientific Advisor to the Taskforce
Dr Rajendra K Pachauri (India)
© International Climate Change Taskforce, 2005
International Climate Change Taskforce
Meeting the Climate Challenge
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
ISBN 1 86030 264 5
First published January 2005 by
The Institute for Public Policy Research
30–32 Southampton Street
London, WC2E 7RA
www.ippr.org
The Center for American Progress
1333 H Street, NW
10th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
www.americanprogress.org
The Australia Institute
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Eggleston Road
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
www.tai.org.au
Contents
Foreword vii
Summary of main recommendations ix
Introduction 1
1. A long-term climate objective 3
2. A global framework for post-2012 commitments 5
3. Technology and trading partnerships 7
4. Driving a low-carbon energy future worldwide 10
5. Facilitating adaptation to climate change 12
6. Communicating climate change 14
Appendix A: Terms of reference 18
Appendix B: Taskforce members 19
Appendix C: Taskforce secretariat 23
Acknowledgements 27
Foreword
The vast majority of international scientists and peer-reviewed reports affirm that climate change
is a serious and growing threat, leaving no country, however wealthy, immune from the extreme
weather events and rising sea levels that scientists predict will occur, unless action is taken.
By reducing anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that are
currently being emitted into the atmosphere, we can mitigate climate change as well as have a
real opportunity to enhance energy security and drive technological modernisation in both an
economical and environmentally friendly way. The development of clean, climate-friendly energy
technologies will provide new business opportunities and new avenues of prosperity for both
developed and developing countries alike.
As the causes of climate change are global, however, the challenge can only be met with all the
countries of the world working together. The politics involved are difficult, but we believe progress
can be made.
To develop solutions as to how to move forward, the International Climate Change Taskforce was
established by three leading think tanks – the Institute for Public Policy Research in the United
Kingdom (UK), the Center for American Progress in the United States (US), and The Australia
Institute. It is a unique international cross-party, cross-sector collaboration, including leaders from
public service, science, business, and civil society in both developed and developing countries.
The Taskforce's recommendations are to all governments and policymakers worldwide. They are
published in the year when the UK holds the presidencies of the G8 and EU, during which the
UK's Prime Minister Tony Blair has pledged to make climate change an agenda priority as one of
the most serious and far-reaching challenges of the twenty-first century. It is also the year in which
the Kyoto Protocol comes into force and nations start discussions on future global action on climate
change.
The strength of our recommendations is that we have been able to find common ground. We have
set out a pathway to engage all countries in concerted action on climate change, including those
not bound by the Kyoto Protocol and major developing countries. We have not been able to consider
every aspect of this complex problem, but this is not our final word. Later this year, we plan
to publish a report that will further elaborate on our recommendations.
We believe that our proposals can become the foundation for action and a blueprint for moving
forward. The prize is precious – to bequeath to all our children a world as rich in life and
opportunity as the one we inherited. But time is short. Action is required now if we are
to win thebattle against climate change.
Rt Hon. Stephen Byers MP Senator Olympia J. Snowe
Co-Chair Co-Chair
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
ixA long-term objective be established to prevent global average temperature from rising more than 2°C
(3.6°F) above the pre-industrial level, to limit the extent and magnitude of climate-change impacts.
A global framework be adopted that builds on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and enables all
countries to be part of concerted action on climate change at the global level in the post-2012 period,
on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.
G8 governments establish national renewable portfolio standards to generate at least 25% of
electricity from renewable energy sources by 2025, with higher targets needed for some G8
governments.
G8 governments increase their spending on research, development, and demonstration of advanced
technologies for energy-efficient and low- and zero-carbon energy supply by two-fold or more by 2010,
at the same time as adopting near-term strategies for the large-scale deployment of existing low- and
no-carbon technologies.
The G8 and other major economies, including from the developing world, form a G8+ Climate Group,
to pursue technology agreements and related initiatives that will lead to large emissions reductions.
The G8+ Climate Group agree to shift their agricultural subsidies from food crops to biofuels, especially
those derived from cellulosic materials, while implementing appropriate safeguards to ensure sustainable
farming methods are encouraged, culturally and ecologically sensitive land preserved, and
biodiversity protected.
All developed countries introduce national mandatory cap-and-trade systems for carbon emissions,
and construct them to allow for their future integration into a single global market.
Governments remove barriers to and increase investment in renewable energy and energy efficient
technologies and practices through such measures as the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies and
requiring Export Credit Agencies and Multilateral Development Banks to adopt minimum efficiency or
carbon intensity standards for projects they support.
Developed countries honour existing commitments to provide greater financial and technical assistance
to help vulnerable countries adapt to climate change, including the commitments made at the
seventh conference of the parties to the UNFCCC in 2001, and pursue the establishment of an international
compensation fund to support disaster mitigation and preparedness.
Governments committed to action on climate change raise public awareness of the problem and build
public support for climate policies by pledging to provide substantial long-term investment in effective
climate communication activities.
Summary of main recommendations
1 A long-term objective be established to prevent global average temperature from rising more than 2°C
(3.6°F) above the pre-industrial level, to limit the extent and magnitude of climate-change impacts.
2 A global framework be adopted that builds on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and enables all
countries to be part of concerted action on climate change at the global level in the post-2012 period,
on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.
3 G8 governments establish national renewable portfolio standards to generate at least 25% of
electricity from renewable energy sources by 2025, with higher targets needed for some G8
governments.
4 G8 governments increase their spending on research, development, and demonstration of advanced
technologies for energy-efficient and low- and zero-carbon energy supply by two-fold or more by 2010,
at the same time as adopting near-term strategies for the large-scale deployment of existing low- and
no-carbon technologies.
5 The G8 and other major economies, including from the developing world, form a G8+ Climate Group,
to pursue technology agreements and related initiatives that will lead to large emissions reductions.
6 The G8+ Climate Group agree to shift their agricultural subsidies from food crops to biofuels, especially
those derived from cellulosic materials, while implementing appropriate safeguards to ensure sustainable
farming methods are encouraged, culturally and ecologically sensitive land preserved, and
biodiversity protected.
7 All developed countries introduce national mandatory cap-and-trade systems for carbon emissions,
and construct them to allow for their future integration into a single global market.
8 Governments remove barriers to and increase investment in renewable energy and energy efficient
technologies and practices through such measures as the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies and
requiring Export Credit Agencies and Multilateral Development Banks to adopt minimum efficiency or
carbon intensity standards for projects they support.
9 Developed countries honour existing commitments to provide greater financial and technical assistance
to help vulnerable countries adapt to climate change, including the commitments made at the
seventh conference of the parties to the UNFCCC in 2001, and pursue the establishment of an international
compensation fund to support disaster mitigation and preparedness.
10 Governments committed to action on climate change raise public awareness of the problem and build
public support for climate policies by pledging to provide substantial long-term investment in effective
climate communication activities.
Introduction
Climate change represents one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing humankind
in the twenty-first Century. The international consensus of scientific opinion, led by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is agreed that global temperature is increasing and
that the main cause is the accumulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere as a result of human activities.
1 Scientific opinion is also agreed that the threat posedwill become more severe over coming decades.
2The cost of failing to mobilise in the face of this threat is likely to be
extremely high. The economic costs alone will be very large: as extreme
weather events such as droughts and floods become more destructive and
frequent; communities, cities, and island nations are damaged or inundated
as sea level rises; and agricultural output is disrupted.
3 The social andhuman costs are likely to be even greater, encompassing mass loss of life,
the spread or exacerbation of diseases, dislocation of populations, geopolitical
instability, and a pronounced decrease in the quality of life.
4 Impactson ecosystems and biodiversity are also likely to be devastating.
5Preventing dangerous climate change, therefore, must be seen as a
precondition for prosperity and a public good, like national security and
public health.
By contrast, the cost of taking smart, effective action to meet the challenge
of climate change should be entirely manageable. Such action need not
undermine standards of living.
6 Furthermore, by taking action now anddeveloping a long-term climate policy regime we can ensure that the
benefits of climate protection are achieved at least cost.
Climate change, energy security, and the urgent need to increase access to
modern energy services for the world’s poor create an enormous need for
more efficient low-carbon and no-carbon energy-supply options. We need a
transformative technological revolution in the twenty-first century involving the development and
rapid deployment of cleaner energy and transportation technologies. By reducing greenhouse emissions
and deploying new climate-friendly technologies, companies can create jobs and launch a new
era of economic prosperity.
The political and economic effort required is both large and achievable. Many of the technologies
we need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – technologies that use energy more efficiently and
generate it from renewable sources – already exist. They are here, they are affordable, and their
use could make an enormous contribution right now, while simultaneously promoting energy
security and stimulating innovation. Other technologies require longer-term development, but for
those nations and companies that choose to move quickly, there is a real opportunity to get ahead
of the technological curve. Likewise, governments and companies that fail to realize these
opportunities will soon fall far behind competitors already honing their strategies to compete in a
carbon-constrained world.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
1Preventing
dangerous
climate change
must be seen as
a precondition for
prosperity and a
public good, like
national security
and public health
Meeting the Climate Challenge
Governments have already begun to work together to address the threat of climate change under
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto
Protocol, which enters into legal force in February 2005. Yet the scale of international action taken
or pledged to date represents only a beginning. The UK’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by 60 per cent by 2050 is the leading example of governmental commitment and illustrates
the scale of change that must be achieved.
To avoid foreclosing climate stabilisation options and to prevent dangerous climate change,
vigorous action to reduce global emissions must start now. Securing adequate and equitable
future commitments to act from all developed and developing countries is essential, on the basis
of their common but differentiated responsibilities. And as developing countries are the least
responsible for climate change to date and the most vulnerable to it, developed countries have a
duty to assist them in action to address it.
To chart a way forward, an International Climate Change Taskforce, composed of leading
scientists, public officials, and representatives of business and non-governmental organisations,
was established at the invitation of three leading public policy institutes – the Institute for Public
Policy Research, the Center for American Progress and The Australia Institute. The Taskforce’s
aim has been to develop proposals to consolidate and build on the gains achieved under the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to ensure that climate change is addressed effectively over the
long term. In doing so, the Taskforce has met twice, in Windsor, United Kingdom and Sydney,
Australia, where we reviewed and debated detailed research papers prepared by the Taskforce
Secretariat, provided by the three founding organisations.
The Taskforce’s recommendations are to all governments and policy-makers worldwide. However,
particular emphasis is placed on providing independent advice to the governments of the Group of
Eight (G8) and the European Union (EU) in the context of the UK’s presidencies of both
organisations in 2005, during which Prime Minister Tony Blair has pledged to make addressing
climate change a priority. The recommendations are also made in the context of the start of
international negotiations in 2005 on future collective action on climate change, and the need to
engage the governments of those industrialised countries that have not ratified the
Kyoto Protocol.
The Taskforce’s recommendations are presented in the following pages.
2
1. A long-term climate objective
The UNFCCC remains the fundamental basis for international action to address climate change.
Its ultimate objective, agreed to by 189 nations, including all major developed and developing
countries, is to achieve “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”
7 Yet tenyears after the UNFCCC came into force, that objective remains undefined.
The Taskforce is agreed that establishing a long-term climate objective is necessary to ensure the
adequacy of the next round of commitments under the UN global climate negotiations, as well as
that of domestic climate policies and the decisions of businesses and institutional investors.
Therefore, the Taskforce recommends that governments at the very least initiate a domestic
process to reach agreement on a national long-term objective. They should also pledge to support
the initiation of political negotiations on setting a global long-term
objective, which would logically take place under the auspices of the UN
process, once sufficient backing is achieved. In both cases, a vigorous
and equitable program to attain the objective will be essential.
In the hope that such processes are undertaken, we have looked into
which long-term climate objective would best fulfil the criterion set out by
the UNFCCC. While no amount of climate change is safe and many
communities, such as those in Arctic regions and low-lying island states,
are already experiencing adverse impacts,
8 scientific evidence suggeststhat there is a threshold of temperature increase above which the extent
and magnitude of the impacts of climate change increase sharply.
9 Noone can say with certainty what that threshold is, but it is important that
we make an educated judgment at this time based on the best available
science.
On the basis of an extensive review of the relevant scientific literature, we
propose a long-term objective of preventing average global surface
temperature from rising by more than 2°C (3.6°F) above its pre-industrial
level (taken as the level in 1750, when carbon dioxide (CO
2) concentrationsfirst began to rise appreciably as a result of human activities).
10Beyond the 2°C level, the risks to human societies and ecosystems grow
significantly. It is likely, for example, that average temperature increases larger than this will entail
substantial agricultural losses, greatly increased numbers of people at risk of water shortages, and
widespread adverse health impacts.
11 Exceeding a global average increase of more than 2°Ccould also imperil a very high proportion of the world’s coral reefs and cause irreversible damage
to important terrestrial ecosystems, including the Amazon rainforest.
12Above the 2°C level, the risks of abrupt, accelerated, or runaway climate change also increase.
The possibilities include reaching climatic tipping points leading, for example, to the loss of the
West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets (which, between them, could raise sea levels more than
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
3We propose a
long-term
objective of
preventing
average global
surface temperature
from rising by
more than 2
oCabove its preindustrial
level
Meeting the Climate Challenge
ten meters over the space of a few centuries), the shutdown of the thermohaline ocean circulation
(and, with it, the Gulf Stream), and the transformation of the planet’s forests and soils from a net
sink of carbon to a net source of carbon.
13Climate science is not yet able to specify the trajectory of atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases that corresponds precisely to any particular global temperature rise. Based on
current knowledge, however, it appears that achieving a high probability of limiting global average
temperature rise to 2°C will require that the increase in greenhouse-gas concentrations as well as
all the other warming and cooling influences on global climate in the year 2100, as compared with
1750, should add up to a net warming no greater than what would be associated with a CO
2concentration of about 400 parts per million (ppm).
14Concentrations of CO
2 alone (standing at 379ppm in March 2004 compared to the pre-industriallevel of 280ppm)
15 are likely to rise above 400ppm in coming decades and could rise far higherunder a business-as-usual scenario. At the same time, atmospheric levels of reflecting and
cloud-forming particles, which are partly offsetting greenhouse gas warming today, will continue to
go down. Action is therefore required that includes immediate measures to reduce emissions of all
greenhouse gases and soot (a heat-trapping form of particulate matter), as well as a commitment
to protect and expand the capacity of forests and soils to draw down CO
2 from the atmosphere.In the light of evolving scientific evidence, the Taskforce recommends that emissions reductions
should aim to achieve greenhouse-gas concentration levels by the end of the century compatible
with limiting global average temperature rise to 2°C, and to limit the period of time during which
those concentrations are above levels compatible with that goal.
4
2. A global framework for post-2012 commitments
To achieve the long-term objective of limiting global average temperature rise to 2°C, the
Taskforce recommends that all countries agree to processes leading to limits on their greenhouse
gas emissions “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities.”
16We recommend the development of a global framework for the post-2012 period that builds on the
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, and brings all countries into action on climate change at the
international level over the coming decades. It would be developed as part of the ongoing UN
climate negotiations. It is based on a multi-stage approach
17 anddraws from the South–North dialogue proposal.
18The proposed global framework for the post-2012 period would
enable all countries to contribute to solving the problem of climate
change in an equitable manner by allocating countries to stages
that reflect their national circumstances. In the proposed global
framework, developed countries remain in the two stages defined
in the UNFCCC: those already industrialised (listed in Annex II of
the UNFCCC) and economies in transition (listed in Annex I but not
in Annex II). As a transitional arrangement, the US and Australia
(assuming they do not change their positions on ratifying Kyoto)
are placed on a parallel track with the aim of integrating them with
the global framework as soon as possible after 2012. Developing
countries progress through a three-stage process that initially
aligns climate and development objectives and subsequently
ensures limits on their greenhouse gas emissions, and they move
from stage to stage at a rate reflecting changes in their national
circumstances.
For the
United States and Australia, integration with the globaleffort post-2012 would require making commitments to domestic
action under binding domestic emissions caps and adopting
domestic cap-and-trade schemes for emissions. These schemes
would be harmonised with the EU or Kyoto trading system provided
there is parity in the level of caps or a system of discounting for
credits from schemes with substantially weaker caps. Trading between the systems could begin
during or immediately after the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period. Such trading schemes are
discussed in more detail in the section on technology and trading partnerships below.
In addition to meeting their domestic caps, the United States and Australia are urged to participate
in UNFCCC and Kyoto mechanisms for assisting developing countries to limit their emissions and
adapt to climate change. Cooperation with developing countries on technological and financial
transfer, particularly through established mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), will be particularly important.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
5A global framework that
builds on the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol
and enables all countries
to be part of
concerted action on
climate change at the
global level in the post-
2012 period, on the
basis of equity and
common but differentiated
responsibilities
Meeting the Climate Challenge
With other parties, the United States and Australia would need to negotiate terms under which the
transitional parallel track is integrated fully into the global framework, under the auspices of the
UN global climate negotiations.
Under the global framework,
developed countries take on deeper legally binding emissionreduction commitments, that extend beyond 2012, and which would be periodically negotiated.
They further participate by transferring greater technology and financial resources for mitigation
and adaptation to developing countries through the mechanisms defined under the UNFCCC, the
Kyoto Protocol and associated agreements. In each case, Annex II countries would take on more
ambitious commitments.
The proposed global framework encompasses a three-stage process under which all
developingcountries
are enabled to reduce progressively the carbon intensity of their economies whileensuring their right to economic development. The three stages are:
1. Initially, countries are encouraged and enabled to align development and climate
goals through confidence building measures and incentives. They adopt policies
and measures that decouple economic growth from emissions growth and, where
necessary, are adequately supported by resources provided by developed
countries.
192. Subsequently, countries commit to reducing the carbon intensity of select sectors
of their economies, particularly the energy and transport sectors, and move
progressively towards carbon intensity targets.
203. Ultimately, countries take on binding emission targets, as is the case in Annex I
countries now.
All developing countries would progress through the stages, and they would do so as their
national circumstances permit. The consideration of national circumstances could be guided by
several criteria, including capability to mitigate (for example GDP per capita) and potential to
mitigate (for example degree of energy efficiency, emissions per unit GDP, emissions per capita).
Some countries have already achieved a level of industrialisation that has moved them beyond
the initial stage. Moreover, countries experiencing higher rates of industrialisation would make a
more rapid transition through the stages.
The global framework would continue to develop in accordance with three further
considerations:
the need to meet the long-term climate objective, by ensuring that short-term
targets are linked to and consistent with the long-term goal;
the gradual transition over the long-term towards a system of equal per capita
rights to use the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere; and
developments in climate science and technological innovations.
6
...
3. Technology and trading partnerships
The objective of preventing average global temperature from rising by more than 2°C requires
that constructive action be taken in the near-term to begin reducing emissions in key emitting
countries, including those such as the United States and Australia, which have not ratified Kyoto,
and large developing economies that are not required by Kyoto to reduce emissions. These
actions would involve voluntary partnerships designed to find “win–win” solutions. The overall
strategy should be focused on developing low-carbon or no-carbon energy sources, including
renewable energy, and increasing energy efficiency. As part of that strategy, agreements at the
sub-global level among significant emitters can address specific emissions and technology
development challenges that complement existing climate change regimes.
The Taskforce recommends that the G8 could play a vital role in
pursuing technology and trading agreements, by establishing a G8+
Climate Group that includes other large developed and developing
country economies.
Consistent with the objectives of such a G8+ Climate Group, G8
governments should take two important steps:
Firstly, they should aim to increase their spending on
research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of
advanced technologies for energy-end-use efficiency and
low-carbon and no-carbon energy supply by two-fold or
more by 2010. This should be done in conjunction with
adopting strategies to ensure the near-term and large-scale
deployment of existing low- and no-carbon technologies.
Secondly, G8 countries should establish national renewable
portfolio standards to generate at least 25 per cent of electricity
from renewable energy sources by 2025, following
models established by a growing number of developed and
developing countries. Higher targets will be needed for
some G8 countries.
21The Taskforce also recommends that the G8+ Climate Group adopt
the initiatives presented below, which provide innovative examples of
how to engage countries in confidence building mitigation strategies. They highlight immediate
opportunities to reduce emissions in the transport and stationary energy sectors, focusing on
areas where insufficient progress has been made, where opportunities for technology leapfrogging
are available, and where countries are facing critical near-term investment decisions.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
7The G8 could play a
vital role in pursuing
technology and
trading agreements,
by establishing a
G8+ Climate Group
that includes other
large developed and
developing country
economies
.
.
Meeting the Climate Challenge
Highly efficient vehicles
The transport sector accounts for approximately one third of global greenhouse gas emissions.
22While increased investment in public transportation systems is one important strategy to reduce
emissions in this sector, these emissions can also be greatly reduced through improvements in
fuel efficiency. For example, hybrid gasoline/electric cars can cut fuel use by one-third.
23 TheTaskforce recommends that a technology partnership be created in which the G8+ Climate Group
agrees to promote accelerated market penetration of hybrids and other highly efficient vehicles
(HEVs).
This should be achieved through enhanced fuel efficiency standards and/or tax incentives or
grants for the purchase of HEVs, sustained over a substantial period. Governments could also
commit to providing tax incentives for retooling manufacturing plants, and to replacing their own
fleet vehicles with HEVs, thus boosting demand and reducing the costs of production and the
price gap between HEVs and conventional vehicles. These measures are also relevant in rapidly
industrialising countries such as China where car ownership is increasing quickly and the
Government has already begun to set fuel economy standards for cars.
Biofuels
Transport-related emissions can also be reduced by switching away from fossil fuels and towards
renewable energy sources such as biofuels, especially those derived from cellulosic materials,
which can be blended with petroleum based fuels. The Taskforce recommends that the G8+
Climate Group agree to divert their agricultural subsidies to biofuels instead of food crops –
subsidies that currently create artificially low food prices and accordingly undermine agriculture in
developing countries. Governments should seek to promote production of traditional ethanol, such
as that in Brazil, which derives one third of its transport fuel from ethanol produced from sugar
cane,
24 and emerging cellulosic ethanol technologies, which hold even greater promise. G8+Climate Group governments should support measures to increase the market penetration of
biofuels in developing and developed countries. Appropriate safeguards would need to be adopted
to ensure that increased subsidies for biofuels encourage sustainable farming methods, preserve
culturally and ecologically sensitive land, and protect biodiversity.
Cleaner Coal
The Taskforce recommends that subsidies to fossil-fuel projects be reduced over time and priority
given to support for renewable energy and energy efficiency, including through performance-based
subsidies. But coal is expected to retain for some time a major role in the power sector in several
important parts of the world. Prominent among these are China and India, which are planning to
add large amounts of coal-fired power capacity over coming decades. For these countries,
addressing climate change is unlikely to be possible without a strategy for dealing with emissions
from coal, even as the primary long-term objective must be the transition to low or no-carbon
sources of energy.
In practice, that means deploying the coal-fired electricity-generating technologies that offer the
best prospects for capturing carbon in a cost-effective manner for sequestration away from the
atmosphere in the event that such sequestration proves technologically feasible and economically
viable on a significant scale.
25 Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plants arethe best available technology in this respect.
8
In addition, although currently more expensive than conventional coal-fired plants, IGCC plants
offer the possibility of improving their economics through ‘polygeneration’ – the production of
chemicals (including liquid fuels and hydrogen) in parallel with electricity generation. IGCC plants
also provide immediate health benefits by reducing emissions of toxic air pollutants that cause
respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses, which are responsible for thousands of deaths each year
in rapidly industrialising countries.
26In the absence of measures that internalise the environmental damage caused by conventional
coal-fired power plants, there is currently a cost gap between power produced by IGCC and
conventional plants. Therefore, an incentive is needed to promote IGCC plants designed to
accommodate carbon capture and storage as the technology of choice for coal-fuelled power
plants being built in the years immediately ahead.
The G8+ Climate Group could agree to support the construction of such IGCC plants through loan
guarantees from its industrialized members’ export credit agencies (ECAs). Such a program of
loan guarantees for IGCC construction in developing countries, including China and India, would
help to make IGCC cost-competitive with conventional coal-fired power stations. Of course, this
should not occur at the expense of providing additional support for renewables and energy
efficiency projects.
Emissions trading
Domestic emissions trading programs in different parts of the world could be tailored to allow for
their progressive integration into a common international emissions trading regime. The EU’s
emissions trading scheme is now operational, and there are current proposals for domestic
emissions trading in the U.S. and Australia. Successful integration of these programmes will
depend on parity in the levels of the caps, or instituting a system of discounting for credits from a
programme with substantially weaker caps.
Integration offers several benefits:
creating a deeper, unified market is likely to reduce price volatility;
multinational firms operating in different markets can benefit by playing under the same
set of rules;
giving all firms a vested interest in multilateral climate policy engages them in the
development of a new global framework; and
creating an avenue for more active US and Australian participation with the rest of the
developed world serves as a stepping stone to their full integration into the post-2012
global framework.
The Taskforce recommends that the G8+ Climate Group: (1) urge the adoption in all industrialised
countries of national cap-and-trade programs, and (2) promote the development of common
standards for measuring and reporting emissions reductions, as well as clear and compelling
domestic compliance mechanisms, to facilitate the future integration of trading systems. Common
standards should also be developed for project-based offsets, providing additional incentives for
engaging developing countries.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
9. .
.
.
Meeting the Climate Challenge
4. Driving a low-carbon energy future worldwide
Helping countries to reduce the carbon intensity of their economies will enable them to adopt
robust climate commitments at the international level in forthcoming negotiations. Reducing the
carbon intensity of economies, and achieving sustainable levels of energy consumption, based on
increased energy end-use efficiency and low- and zero-carbon energy-supply technologies, should
become the driving force behind technological modernisation.
Increasing the efficiency of energy end-use in homes, offices,
vehicles, and industry offers the largest, fastest, cheapest, and
easiest reductions in carbon intensity available, but cannot
achieve as much reduction as is required. Large contributions will
also be needed from greatly expanded use of low-carbon and nocarbon
energy-supply options. Leading contenders for a large role
in this lower-carbon energy supply mix include fuels derived from
biomass materials that are renewably grown and electricity from
wind and photovoltaics.
27The process of reducing the carbon intensity of the energy
system needs to involve the public and private sectors at all
levels. In particular, the Taskforce recommends that
governments accelerate the process by creating a leadership
coalition of developed and developing countries that are
committed to action on climate change. This coalition should
take action beyond multilateral climate diplomacy by focusing on
synergies between climate and development policies and fully
integrating low- and no-carbon strategies with national
programmes for sustainable development. In particular, the
Taskforce recommends that leadership coalition governments
undertake reforms to increase energy efficiency and reduce the
carbon intensity of energy generation by removing barriers to
and increasing investment in low- and no-carbon technologies
and practices that are commercially viable or close to market.
Reforms at the national level would include:
Levelling the playing field between renewables and fossil fuels, and internalising the
latter’s costs by phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and adopting cap and trade systems as
well as encouraging ecological tax reform and performance based efficiency incentives.
Use of innovative government-supported financial mechanisms, such as clean energy
funds and government-guaranteed investment securities (‘global development bonds’)
that would promote investment in sustainable low- or no-carbon technology
deployment.
Providing new support for low- or no-carbon technology transfer to developing
countries in addition to existing bilateral and multilateral programmes, including by
increasing the provision of concessional finance.
10
Governments
should create a
leadership
coalition of
developed and
developing
countries that are
committed to
action on climate
change
...
Requiring individual Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) to adopt minimum efficiency
standards for the projects they support, or portfolio-wide carbon intensity standards.
Tying local economic development with decarbonisation by relaxing local content
restrictions for ECA-backed projects to encourage the deployment of locally appropriate
low-carbon technologies and the involvement of local partners.
Ensuring the disclosure of climate change related risks by companies and that
institutional investors take account of long-term risks in their investments as part of their
fiduciary duty.
Reforms at the international level would include:
Reviewing and significantly increasing the World Bank target to increase its investment in
renewable energy, arising from the Extractive Industries Review.
Reforming the OECD Arrangement for ECAs to improve the terms offered by ECAs for
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects so that they are at least as favourable
as those for fossil fuel and nuclear energy.
Requiring multilateral banks to take the climate impact of their project financing into
account by conducting energy audits on energy-intensive projects and financing
energy-saving measures, following the lead of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and to adopt minimum efficiency standards for the projects they support or
portfolio-wide carbon intensity standards.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
11...
...
Meeting the Climate Challenge
5. Facilitating adaptation to climate change
Developing countries are already experiencing adverse impacts from climate change and, given
the inertia in the global climate system, some increased level of future impact is inevitable,
regardless of action taken now to reduce emissions.
28 The Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange has concluded that developing countries also stand to experience the most serious
impacts from climate change and have the lowest capacity to adapt to them.
29 Climate changethus threatens to undermine many of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, including that of
eradicating extreme hunger and poverty, with severe consequences for the world’s poorest
people, millions of whom may be forced off their land and become climate refugees.
30Developed countries should accept greater responsibility for
assisting developing countries to adapt to climate change, while
ensuring climate policy directly contributes to poverty eradication.
To this end, developed countries need to achieve a step-change in
their effort. The Taskforce therefore recommends that:
Existing funding commitments on adaptation be honoured.
The EU and other developed countries made a “political
declaration” at the seventh conference of the parties to the
UNFCCC in Marrakech in 2001, to provide $450 million (US)
a year, mostly for adaptation. To date only about $20 million
(US) has been provided.
New and additional funding is provided to guarantee
revenue for adaptation, with contributions linked, in part at
least, to current and historical responsibility for emissions.
This should be done using robust scientific methodology,
such as that being developed under the modelling and
assessment of contributions to climate change (MATCH)
initiative. The long-term future of existing adaptation funding
bodies also needs to be secured by leading industrialised
countries making firm, regular and long-term commitments
of funds to the already-established ‘Marrakech Funds’.
Governments accept accountability for climate change impacts by initiating the
development of an international compensation fund to support disaster mitigation and
preparedness, disaster relief, and relocation in consultation with affected countries and
communities.
Adaptation issues are integrated into development assistance. Aid that is invested in
infrastructure with relatively long life spans should be ‘climate proofed’ by taking projected
impacts into account in design and construction.
12
Developed countries
should accept greater
responsibility for
assisting developing
countries to adapt to
climate change, while
ensuring climate
policy directly
contributes to poverty
eradication
.
.
.
.
Policy makers in vulnerable countries become aware of the implications of climate
change for their citizens and economies. They should apply vulnerability or impact
assessments to all new policies, to exclude anything that puts vulnerable communities at
greater risk, and integrate adaptation policies and measures into development strategies.
Further research is carried out urgently into expected impacts for different regions so that
the most vulnerable communities can be identified. Research is also needed into
best-practice policies and technologies, as well as livelihood strategies to cope with
expected climatic risks.
Assistance is provided to build the capacity of national policy-makers from vulnerable
countries so they can take part in international climate negotiations, undertake policy
implementation domestically, and make appropriate judgements to avoid inappropriate,
maladaptive policies.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
13...
Meeting the Climate Challenge
6. Communicating climate change
There is a clear need for governments to build public support for climate policies that will enable
the world to meet the objective of limiting global average temperature rise to 2°C above
pre-industrial levels. Yet public awareness of climate change, and its solutions, is worryingly low.
31Consequently, in accordance with Article 6 of the UNFCCC, the Taskforce recommends that a
leadership coalition of governments from developed and developing countries pledge to increase
public awareness and build public support for action to mitigate climate change.
Increasing public awareness and building support will require these governments to make
communicating information about climate change to the public a priority, and to take steps to
increase the effectiveness of climate change communication activities. These activities should
have sufficient funding and a consistent message, including the case for the 2°C objective,
sustained over the long-term. Such activities should also be combined with supportive policy
measures which enable the public to take action.
14
Endnotes
1
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis,Cambridge University Press.
2
Ibid.3
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptationand Vulnerability
, Cambridge University Press.4
Ibid.5
Ibid.6
Jorgenson D et al. (2000) The Role of Substitution in Understanding the Costs of ClimateChange Policy
, report prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change.7
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2.8
Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee (2004) Impacts of a WarmingClimate – Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
, Cambridge University Press; and, InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2002)
World Disasters Report, Geneva,Chapter 4.
9
German Advisory Council on Global Change (2003) Climate Protection Strategies for the 21stCentury: Kyoto and beyond
WBGU.10
Other influences on climate were much more important than the rising greenhouse gas concentrationsfor at least the next hundred years, and the global average surface temperature in 1850
was probably a bit cooler than in 1750. But thermometer measurements – which first became
widespread enough to directly determine the global average temperature only around 1860 –
show that between then and 2004 the temperature has risen by about 0.8°C or 1.4°F, and is
expected to rise further still due to climatic inertia. See UK Meteorological Office, ‘2004: Another
Warm Year’, Press release and web posting, December 2004,
http://www.meto.gov.uk/corporate/pressoffice/20041216.html.
11
Parry M, Arnell N, Fischer G, Iglesias A, Kovats S, Livermore M, Martens P, McMichael T,Nicholls R, and Rosenzweig C (2001) ‘Millions at risk: defining critical climate change threats and
targets.’
Global Environmental Change 11: pp. 181–183; and, Fisher G, Shah M, Nachtergaele F,van Velthuizen H (2001)
Global agro-ecological assessment for agriculture in the 21st century,’Laxenburg, Austria.
12
Sheppard C R C (2003) ‘Predicted recurrences of mass coral mortality in the Indian Ocean’Nature
425 (6955): pp.294–297. Hoegh-Guldberg O (1999) ‘Climate change, coral bleaching andthe future of the world’s coral reefs’
Marine and Freshwater Research 50(8): pp.839–866. CowlingS A, Cox P M, Betts R A, Ettwein V J, Jones C D, Maslin M A and Spall S A (2004) ‘Contrasting
simulated past and future responses of the Amazon rainforest to atmospheric change’
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences
359(1443): pp.539–547.13
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis,Cambridge University Press: pp.419–20, 642; and, Cox P, Betts R, Jones C, Spall S and Totterdell
I (2000) ‘Acceleration of global warming due to carbon-cycle feedbacks in a coupled climate
model.’
Nature 408: pp.184–187.14
Baer, Paul (2004) Probabilistic analysis of climate stabilization targets and the implications forprecautionary policy
. Paper presented at the American Geophysical Union Annual Meeting, 17December 2004, San Francisco. The author’s analysis shows, taking into account current uncer-
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
15Meeting the Climate Challenge
tainties in the relevant parameters, that stabilising the net warming and cooling influences on climate
in 2100 at a level corresponding to an increase in CO
2 concentration to 400ppm from its preindustrialvalue of 280ppm yields an 80 per cent chance of limiting global average temperature
rise to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. By contrast, he estimates that stabilising net warming and
cooling influences at the equivalent of 550ppm CO
2 provides only a 10–20 per cent chance of limitingglobal average temperature rise to 2°C. Warming influences on climate, in addition to CO
2,include increases in the concentrations of non-CO
2 greenhouse gases (such as methane, nitrousoxides and halocarbons) and of atmospheric soot. Cooling influences include increases in the
atmospheric concentrations of aerosols (i.e. reflecting and cloud-forming particles), as well as
increases in Earth’s surface reflectivity. See also Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou, “Honesty About
Dangerous Climate Change”, 2004, at www.ecoequity.org/ceo/ceo_8_2.htm.
15
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3732274.stm.16
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 3.1.17
See for example M den Elzen, M Berk, P Lucas, B Eickhout and D van Vuuren, (2003) Exploringclimate regimes for differentiation of commitments to achieve the EU climate target
. RIVM report728001023/2003, Bilthoven, Netherlands www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/728001023.html; and,
Climate Action Network (2003)
A viable global framework for preventing dangerous climatechange
. CAN Discussion Paper: COP9, Milan, Italy. www.climatenetwork.org/docs/CANDP_Framework.pdf.
18
South–North dialogue on equity in the greenhouse (2004) A proposal for an adequate and equitableglobal climate agreement
, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy and theEnergy Research Centre. Financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development (BMZ) www.wupperinst.org/download/1085_proposal.pdf.
19
Sustainable development policies and measures (SD PAMs) allow policy-makers in developingcountries to build climate change policy into sustainable development pathways. This is a relatively
easy way for developing countries to take the first steps towards long-term action on climate
change. For example climate change considerations could be built into national energy sector
pathways, through a focus on delivering sustainable energy services. For more information on SD
PAMs see, for example, H Winkler, R Spalding-Fecher, S Mwakasonda and O Davidson,
‘Sustainable development policies and measures: Starting from development to tackle climate
change’ in Baumert, K
et al (eds). (2002) Building on the Kyoto Protocol – Options for protectingthe climate
, WRI.20
An approach that may be particularly relevant in this stage is the sectoral CDM proposal, whichapplies the policies and measures approach to a particular sector (such as the energy sector)
through the current avenue for developing country participation in the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean
Development Mechanism. Sectoral CDM applies the CDM to sectors rather than just to projects.
Reducing the carbon intensity of the energy and transport sectors could be delivered through a
sectoral CDM approach, creating a strong focus on sustainable energy sector development and
reform. For more information on sectoral CDM see, for example, J Samaniego and C Figueres,
‘Evolving to a sector based Clean Development Mechanism.’ In Baumert, K
et al. (eds). (2002)Building on the Kyoto Protocol – Options for protecting the climate
, WRI.21
France and Italy are already committed to generating 21 per cent and 25 per cent respectivelyof their electricity from renewable sources by 2010. It may therefore be more appropriate for them
to adopt higher targets for 2025 than the minimum 25 per cent target recommended for other G8
countries.
22
International Energy Agency Information Centre http://www.iea.org.16
23
Energy Saving Trust (2002) Pathways to Future Vehicles: A 2020 Strategy.24
Brazilian Government Environment Ministry http://www.mct.gov.br/clima.25
International Energy Agency Information Centre http://www.iea.org.26
Ibid.27
The Taskforce is agreed that renewable energy will have a major role to play and that advancedfossil-fuel technologies which can capture and sequester carbon dioxide may also be important. It
has not taken a position on nuclear energy.
28
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptationand Vulnerability
, Cambridge University Press, pp. 5–7; and, International Federation of RedCross and Red Crescent Societies (2002)
World Disasters Report, Geneva: chapter 4.29
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptationand Vulnerability
, Cambridge University Press: p.8.30
UN Millennium Development Goals http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. DFID (2004) Key sheet1: Climate Change in Africa, in
Climate Change Deepens Poverty and Challenges PovertyReduction Strategies
, Department for International Development; International Panel on ClimateChange(2001)
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge UniversityPress, chapter 7.
31
GlobeScan International Environmental Monitor. www.globescan.com.Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
17Meeting the Climate Challenge
Appendix A: Terms of reference
The International Climate Change Taskforce has been established by the Institute for
Public Policy Research, The Australia Institute and the Center for American Progress to
develop and promote proposals aimed at consolidating and building on the gains
achieved by the Kyoto Protocol at the international level, in order to help ensure that
climate change is addressed effectively over the long term.
To this end the taskforce will review:
Evidence on the economic costs of failing to reduce global emissions of green house
gases and on the technical and economic feasibility of deep emissions reductions by
developed countries, and limits on emissions from developing countries, in the long
term.
Actions necessary for consolidating and building on the gains made by the Kyoto
Protocol, towards achieving the fundamental objective of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change to stabilise the concentration of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Options for securing future commitments on greenhouse gases from all
developed countries, as well as from developing ones.
The taskforce will prepare a final report to be published early in 2005 making
recommendations to policy makers and governments in developed and developing
nations. This report will be widely disseminated but particularly aimed at providing independent
advice to the UK government about how to make progress on international climate
change policy during its presidencies of the G8 nations and the European Union in
2005.
18
.
.
.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
Appendix B: Taskforce members
Co-Chairs
Rt Hon. Stephen Byers MP (UK)
Stephen Byers is a Labour Member of Parliament for North Tyneside and a former
Cabinet Minister in the Blair Government. In 1997 he was made Minister of State for
School Standards. In July 1998 he entered the Cabinet as Chief Secretary to the Treasury
and in December 1998 he was appointed as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. He
held this post until the 2001 General Election after which he was made Secretary of State
for Transport, Local Government and the Regions. He resigned from the government in
May 2002.
Senator Olympia J
. Snowe (USA)Olympia J. Snowe is a two-term Republican U.S. Senator from the state of Maine.
Olympia chairs the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee and is on the
Senate Finance Committee; the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee; and
the Select Committee on Intelligence. She is an active cosponsor of the McCain-Leiberman
Climate Stewardship Act for mandatory emissions reductions and a market cap and trade
system, and a leader for abrupt climate change research. Olympia was a member of the
U.S. House of Representatives from 1978 to 1994.
Taskforce Members
Hon. Bob Carr MP (Australia)
Bob Carr is the Premier of New South Wales. During his premiership he has introduced
strict greenhouse emission benchmark laws in NSW and a new state Greenhouse Office.
He has created 345 new national parks, receiving the 1998 World Conservation Union
International Parks Merit Award.
Professor John P Holdren (USA)
Dr John Holdren is a Professor of Environmental Policy and Director of the Program on
Science, Technology, and Public Policy in the John F. Kennedy School of Government.
John also holds professorial chairs at Harvard University and the University of California.
He received the 1999 Kaul Foundation Award in Science and Environmental Policy, the
2000 Tyler Prize for Environmental Achievement, and the 2001 Heinz Prize in Public
Policy.
19
Meeting the Climate Challenge
20Martin Khor Kok-Peng (Malaysia)
Martin Khor is director of Third World Network. He has been a Member of the Board of the
South Centre, and Vice Chairman of the Expert Group on the Right to Development of the
UN Commission on Human Rights. He has conducted studies and written papers for the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Development
Programme and United Nations Environment Programme, including
Intellectual Property,Biodiversity and Sustainable Development
(2002).Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet MP (France)
Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet is a Member of the French National Assembly for the
governing party, the Union pour un Mouvement Populiare (UMP). She is President of the
Committee on health and environment for the UMP and Executive Secretary of the
Council on sustainable development of the UMP. Her published books include:
Pourquoiune charte de l’environnement? Une charte pour quoi faire? La révolution tranquille de
l’écologie
(2001).Dr Claude Martin (Switzerland)
Dr Claude Martin is Director General of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) International. As
Director General of WWF International, Claude has initiated new approaches, including
partnerships with the World Bank and business and industry groups. He is a member of
the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED),
a high level advisory body to the Chinese Government.
Professor Tony McMichael (Australia)
Tony McMichael is Director of the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, at
The Australian National University, Canberra. Previously he had been Professor of
Epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. He has chaired the
working-group assessment of health risks for the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, and is now undertaking the international Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project.
Jonathon Porritt (UK)
Jonathon Porritt is Programme Director and co-founder of Forum for the Future and
Chairman of the UK Sustainable Development Commission. In addition he is Co-Director
of The Prince of Wales’s Business and Environment Programme, Trustee of WWF UK and
Vice-President of the Socialist Environment Resources Association. He was formerly
Director of Friends of the Earth. Jonathon received a CBE in January 2000 for services to
environmental protection.
Adair Turner (UK)
Adair Turner is Vice Chairman of Merrill Lynch Europe. From 1995 to 1999 he was
Director General of the Confederation of British Industry. He is currently a director of
United Business Media plc, Chair of the UK Low Pay Commission and Chair of the UK
Pensions Commission. He is also a Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics
and a trustee of WWF UK.
Dr Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker (Germany)
Dr Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker is a member of the German Bundestag for the Social
Democratic Party (SPD). Since 2002, he has been the Chair of the Parliamentary
Committee on Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. He was Director of
the Institute for European Environmental Policy in Bonn, London and Paris from 1984-
1991, and President of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy from
1991-2000.
Professor Ni Weidou (China)
Professor Ni Weidou is Director of the Clean Energy Centre at Tsinghua University. As the
member of the Consultant Group of State Fundamental Research and Planning and the
Co-chairman of Energy Group of CCICED, he gives advice on state energy policies.
He is in close cooperation with the University Committee of Environment of Harvard
University and the Centre for Energy and Environment Studies of Princeton University.
Hon. Timothy E Wirth (USA)
Timothy Wirth is the President of the United Nations Foundation and Better World Fund.
He has been a member of the US House of Representatives and US Senate where he
focussed on environmental issues, especially global climate change and population
stabilisation. He served in the US Department of State as the first Undersecretary for
Global Affairs from 1993 to 1997.
Cathy Zoi (Australia)
Cathy Zoi is Group Executive Director of Bayard Capital, an environment and sustainable
energy company. She co-chairs the New South Wales (NSW) Government’s Sustainability
Advisory Council. Previously, Cathy was Assistant Director General of the NSW
Environmental Protection Agency, the founding CEO of the Sustainable Energy
Development Authority, and Chief of Staff of Environmental Policy in the Clinton White
House. She has been a company director for a number of start-up renewable energy
enterprises.
Scientific Adviser to the Taskforce
Dr Rajendra K Pachauri (India)
Dr R K Pachauri supported the taskforce in the capacity of Scientific Adviser.
Dr Pachauri is Director General of The Energy and Resources Institute, and chair of the
UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. His wide ranging expertise has
resulted in his membership of various international and national committees and boards,
including chairing the Committee on Developing Countries from 1989 to 1990. He has
also authored 21 books and many papers and articles.
21
Recommendations of the International Climate Change TaskforceMeeting the Climate Challenge
Appendix C: Taskforce secretariat
The Institute for Public Policy Research
www.ippr.org.uk
The Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr) is the UK’s leading progressive think tank
and was established in 1988. Its role is to bridge the political divide between social
democratic and liberal traditions, the intellectual divide between academia and the policy
making establishment, and the cultural divide between government and civil society. It is
first and foremost a research institute aiming to provide innovative and credible policy
solutions. Its work, the questions its research poses and the methods it uses are driven
by the belief that a journey to a good society is one that places social justice, democratic
participation and environmental sustainability at its core.
Nick Pearce
Nick Pearce is Director of ippr. He was previously Special Adviser to David Blunkett MP
when he was Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Education & Employment. He
has also been an adviser to the Prime Minister’s Social Exclusion Unit.
Dr Tony Grayling
Tony Grayling is an Associate Director and head of the Sustainability Team at ippr. Tony
has previously been a special adviser to the UK Minister for Transport, and the
environmental policy officer for the Labour Party.
Simon Retallack
Simon Retallack is a Research Fellow at ippr, specialising in international climate change
policy. Simon is also co-director of the Climate Initiatives Fund, a grant-making foundation,
and was commissioning editor of
The Ecologist magazine.The Center for American Progress
www.americanprogress.org
The Center for American Progress (CAP) is a non-partisan research and educational
institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity
for all Americans. It believes that Americans are bound together by a common
commitment to these values and it aspires to ensure that national policies reflect these
values. It works to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and
international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that is
“of all the people, by all the people, and for all the people.”
22
John Podesta
John Podesta is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for American
Progress. He served as Chief of Staff to President Bill Clinton from October 1998 to
January 2001 and previously was an Assistant to the President then Deputy Chief of Staff.
Podesta is currently a Visiting Professor of Law on the faculty of the Georgetown
University Law Center.
Todd Stern
Todd Stern is a Partner of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering. He served in the Clinton
Administration in various capacities, including Assistant to the President for Special
Projects and Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury. Between 1997 and 1999, he
served as the senior White House negotiator at the Kyoto and Buenos Aires negotiations.
Dr Ana Unruh Cohen
Ana Unruh Cohen is the associate director for environmental policy at the Center for
American Progress. Prior to joining American Progress, she was an aide to Congressman
Edward J Markey (D-MA) for three years, handling energy and environmental issues
pending before the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Resources Committee.
Ken Gude
Ken Gude is the Director of Research on the International Rights and Responsibilities
Project at the Center for American Progress. Prior to joining American Progress, Gude
was a Policy Analyst at the Center for National Security Studies. He previously worked at
the Council on Foreign Relations.
The Australia Institute
www.tai.org.au
The Australia Institute is an independent public policy research centre funded by grants
from philanthropic trusts, memberships and commissioned research. It was launched in
1994 to develop and conduct research and policy analysis and to participate forcefully in
public debates. In addition, the Institute undertakes research and analysis commissioned
and paid for by government, business, unions and community organisations.
Unconstrained by ideologies of the past, the purpose of the Institute is to help create a
vision of a more just, sustainable and peaceful Australian society and to develop and
promote that vision in a pragmatic and effective way.
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
23Dr Clive Hamilton
Dr Clive Hamilton is Executive Director of The Australia Institute. He has held visiting
academic positions at the Universities of Cambridge, Sydney and the Australian National
University. Previous positions include Head of Research at the Federal Government’s
Resource Assessment Commission. Dr Hamilton has published on climate change policy
and environmental economics, including
Growth Fetish.Alan Tate
Alan Tate has been involved in national and international climate policy for more than a
decade. He is the recipient of Australia’s most prestigious journalism award – the Gold
Walkey – when National Environment Correspondent to the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation. Alan became a founding partner in Cambiar in 2001,
Justin Sherrard
Justin Sherrard co-founded Cambiar with Alan Tate, a Sydney-based strategy consultancy
that works with progressive businesses and Governments on gaining competitive
advantage and public support by focussing on Sustainability. He has 15 years of global
experience of environmental issues and their solutions.
Meeting the Climate Challenge
24Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following organisations and individuals for their generous financial
support: Ashden Trust, BAA, CE Electric, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, Lord Kumar
Bhattacharya, Greenpeace Trust, Poola Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Shell
International.
Many people have helped with this project. We would particularly like to thank Ginny
Worrest (Office of Senator Olympia Snowe), Professor Liu Deshun (Tsinghua University,
Beijing), Duncan Marsh (UN Foundation) Jennifer Morgan (WWF International), and Pippa
Clarke (Office of Rt Hon. Stephen Byers MP) who ably provided advice and represented
the Taskforce members with whom they work. We are also grateful to Dr. Rajendra K
Pachauri (IPCC and TERI, India) who attended both Taskforce meetings and gave generously
of his time and expert advice, to retired Ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta
(India) whose advice we greatly valued and to José Miguez (Inter-ministerial Commission
on Climate Change, Brazil), who participated in the first Taskforce meeting in Windsor.
In addition to those prepared by the secretariat, excellent working papers were prepared
for the Taskforce by Kate Hampton (Green Globe Network, UK), Fanny Calder (Chatham
House, UK), Saleemul Huq (IEED, UK and Bangladesh), Jonathan Pershing and Rob
Bradley (World Resources Institute, USA) and Joseph Aldy (Harvard University, USA).
Thanks also to David Griggs (Hadley Centre, UK) for presenting the Taskforce at Windsor.
Thanks to Paul Baer (University of California at Berkeley, USA) who provided probability
analysis on climate change scenarios and to Nathan Sansom, Tim Gibbs, Chris Moss and
Tatyana Eatwell who provided first-rate research and administrative assistance at ippr.
Also thanks to Matt Brown of the Center for American Progress and John Schwartz of
ippr for work beyond the call of duty to design and produce this report to a high quality at
a moment's notice.
In the course of our research we consulted many people who provided valuable advice
and information, who, in addition to those people cited above, include: John Ashton
(E3G, UK); Vicki Bakhshi (No 10 Policy Unit, UK); Richard Betts (Hadley Centre, UK);
Deb Callahan (LCV, USA); Morag Carter (David Suzuki Foundation, Canada); Amée
Christiansen (Environment 2004, USA); Eileen Claussen (Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, USA); Catherine Day (DG Environment, European Commission); Henry Derwent
(DEFRA, UK); Elliot Diringer (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, USA); Alex Evans
(DFID, UK); Jeff Fiedler (NRDC, USA); The Honorable Wayne Gilchrest (House of
Representatives, USA); James Greene (Senator Biden’s office, USA); Stephen Hale
(DEFRA, UK); Bill Hare (Greenpeace International); Sarah Hendry (DEFRA, UK); Geoff
Jenkins (Hadley Centre, UK); Yasuko Kameyama (National Institute for Environmental
Studies, Japan); Radhika Khosla (TERI, India); Alexey Kokorin (WWF, Russia); Charlie
Recommendations of the International Climate Change Taskforce
25Kronick (Greenpeace, UK); John Lanchbery (RSPB, UK); Laurie Lee (No 10 Policy Unit,
UK); Chee Yoke Ling (Third World Network, Malaysia); Frank Loy (Environment 2004,
USA); Betsy Loyless (LCV, USA); Abbie Meador (Representative Olver’s office, USA);
Youssef Nassef (UNFCCC); Catherine Pearce (FoE International); Nigel Purvis (Brookings
Institute, USA); Hannah Reid (IIED, UK); James D Reilly (Senator Carper’s office, USA);
Nick Rowley (No 10 Policy Unit, UK); David Sandalow (Brookings Institute, USA); Andrew
Simms (NEF, UK); Youba Sokona (Observatory of the Sahara & Sahel, Tunisia); Edith
Thompson (Represenative Gilchrest’s office, USA); Halldor Thorgeirsson (UNFCCC);
Dennis Tirpak (UNFCCC); Christian Turner (British Embassy, Washington DC); Hans
Verolme (British Embassy, Washington DC); Jos Wheatley (DFID, UK); Yoke Waller-
Hunter (UNFCCC); Harald Winkler (Energy Research Centre, South Africa); Bryony
Worthington (FoE, UK); Henning Wuester (UNFCCC); Farhana Yamin (Institute of
Development Studies, UK).
Meeting the Climate Challenge
26There can be few greater challenges in the twenty-first century than addressing the threat of climate
change. Left unmitigated, the impacts are expected to be devastating. Urgent action is needed.
As a global problem, it requires global solutions. In this report, a high level taskforce, brought together
from across the globe by three of the world’s leading think tanks, set out their
conclusions on how to move forward. The recommendations of the International Climate Change
Taskforce are a blueprint for action and offer a strong foundation for
meeting the climate challenge.